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Derrida’s account of Kant’s and Schelling’s writings on the origins of the mod-
ern university are interpreted to show that theoretical positions attempting to 
oversee and master the contemporary university find themselves destabilized 
or deconstructed. Two examples of contemporary attempts to install the lib-
eral arts as the guardians and overseers of the contemporary university are 
examined. Both examples fall prey to the types of deconstructive displace-
ments identified by Derrida. The very different reasoning behind Derrida’s 
own institutional intervention in the modern French university is discussed. 
This discussion leads to concluding comments on the need to defend pure re-
search in the humanities, as well as in the social and natural sciences, rather 
than elevating the classical liberal arts to a privileged position.
RÉSUMÉ
Le compte-rendu de Derrida sur les écrits de Kant et de Schelling portant sur 
les origines de l’université moderne démontre que des positions théoriques 
tentant de surveiller et de gouverner l’université contemporaine se trouvent 
déstabilisées et déconstruites. L’auteur étudie deux exemples de tentatives 
contemporaines visant à donner aux arts libéraux le statut de gardiens et de 
surveillants de l’université contemporaine. Les deux exemples en question ne 
tiennent pas la route devant les substitutions déconstructives identifiées par 
Derrida. On y discute le raisonnement fort différent derrière l’intervention 
institutionnelle  au sein d’universités françaises modernes propre à Derrida. 
Cette discussion mène à des commentaires conclusifs sur le besoin de défendre 
la recherche pure dans les sciences humaines, sociales et naturelles, plutôt 
que d’élever les arts libéraux classiques à un rang privilégié.
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INTRODUCTION: CHAMPIONING THE LIBERAL ARTS
A defence of liberal arts education always implies a diagnosis of the contemporary 
university and usually implies a diagnosis of the surrounding society.1 For example, 
Nussbaum (2010) argues that humanities education is under threat in a society that 
places too much emphasis on the type of knowledge that contributes directly to the 
economy. An education in the humanities is an “education for democracy” (the title of 
her second chapter); that is, its purpose is educating citizens rather than training work-
ers. Thus are an analysis and diagnosis of the university developed and a diagnosis of 
contemporary society implied. The argument, about both the university and the wider 
society, is effectively encapsulated in Nussbaum’s title: Not for Profit: Why Democracy 
Needs the Humanities. The details of her argument (e.g., p. 45–46, 27ff., 47ff., 95ff.) 
concern, for example, the need to learn to see the world from the viewpoint of others, to 
overcome feelings of disgust for stigmatized minorities, for education in the arts in order 
to cultivate the imagination, and for critical thinking or Socratic argument. Despite what 
is engaging and thought-provoking in her argument, it is difficult to see how to deduce 
from this argument criteria for the aims of liberal education, and for the curriculum that 
would meet those aims. One can imagine many other needs added to those Nussbaum 
discusses, and one can imagine some inspired by a more conservative or a more radical 
political sensibility than hers. From the start, she assumes a humane and liberal sensibil-
ity, and a belief that the humanities are morally salutary. The arguments derived from 
these assumptions will be unlikely to persuade those who do not share, or are opposed 
to, such assumptions.
Fish’s (2008) slightly earlier intervention in the same terrain helps clarify what is 
problematic about Nussbaum’s approach. Fish argues that the university and its disci-
plines have their own internal logic and coherence, and that they do not need an external 
moral or political rationale to justify their existence and functioning. The purpose of a 
university, he explains, is to introduce students to the knowledge and traditions of inqui-
ry of the disciplines, and to teach them the analytical skills to be able to negotiate their 
way in those disciplines. Fish insists that these skills are all a university should attempt 
to teach. Any attempts to engage in moral education or to promote civic responsibility 
or to inculcate a taste for social justice will fail. The scientific and scholarly disciplines 
are not designed for these tasks, which Fish implies are matters for socialization, not 
for education. Furthermore, professors are not qualified to engage in moral education, 
and if they were trained for this role, they would no longer be professors, but would be 
more like “moralists” and “therapists” (p. 14). At this point, the contrast with Nussbaum 
becomes instructive. Once the division of the university into specialized disciplines is 
acknowledged, the result is that any systematic attempt to construct a core curriculum 
for purposes of moral and civic education then appears to be arbitrary. The university 
simply is an institution with a highly developed division of intellectual labour, and no 
account of a core curriculum as moral education can fundamentally alter this division 
of labour. The implication is that this division of intellectual labour—along with a highly 
developed level of specialization across all the institutional spheres of society—is a core 
feature of modernity and cannot be wished away. This is not to say that universities can-
not be persuaded to adopt modest curricular reform, such as increasing breadth require-
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ments; however, a full-scale attempt to develop a core curriculum would require that 
one discipline or one set of disciplinary concerns would have to rule over the other dis-
ciplines. Any such attempt is more likely to result, not in a shared culture, but in strife.
The premise of what follows is that most attempts to revivify the liberal arts and hu-
manities are caught at a kind of tension or switching point between the positions repre-
sented by Nussbaum and Fish. The appeal that the liberal arts should form a core curricu-
lum of moral education runs against the grain of the specialization and division of labour 
characteristic of modernity. However, the intellectual specialization characteristic of mo-
dernity seems to call out for an account of intellectual activity which gathers together or 
unifies the specialized disciplines, and it is to this call that liberal arts advocates respond. 
This paper gradually outlines an alternative to either position: a deconstructive ap-
proach that sustains an affirmative questioning of the founding assumptions of the special-
ized disciplines, and at the same time refrains from ushering in a unifying synthesis of the 
disciplines. The paper proceeds as follows. The first section provides an account of selected 
aspects of Derrida’s contributions to debates about the university, focusing on Derrida’s 
reading of the writings of Kant and Schelling, which roughly correspond respectively to 
Fish’s position on the division of intellectual labour, and to Nussbaum’s call for an edu-
cation that transcends this division of labour. The upshot of Derrida’s account is that all 
positions attempting to oversee and master the contemporary university find themselves 
destabilized or deconstructed. The second section examines two contemporary attempts to 
install the liberal arts as the guardians and overseers of the contemporary university, and 
shows how these examples fall prey to the types of deconstructive displacements identified 
by Derrida. The final section briefly discusses the reasoning behind Derrida’s institutional 
intervention in the modern French university. This discussion contrasts with the liberal 
arts advocacy discussed in the previous section and leads to concluding comments about 
the need to defend pure research in the humanities, and in the social and natural sciences, 
rather than elevating the classical liberal arts to a privileged position.
DERRIDA ON THE UNIVERSITY
In a paper from 1980, Derrida presents some interpretations of Kant’s 1798 essay, The 
Conflict of the Faculties. Derrida (2004a, citing Kant, 1979, p. 23) quotes the opening pas-
sage of the essay, in which Kant describes the modern university of specialized disciplines.2 
The university, Kant tells us, is “a public means for treating the sum of knowledge... in a 
quasi-industrial manner, with a division of labour where, for as many fields as there may 
be of knowledge, so many public teachers would be allotted.” The university would have 
autonomy, “for only scholars can pass judgment on scholars as such.” It would be divided 
into faculties; that is, “various small societies into which university teachers are divided, 
in keeping with the variety of the main branches of knowledge.” These faculties would be 
authorized to “admit... student-apprentices from the lower schools aspiring to its level,” 
and also to grant to teachers who are “not drawn from the members themselves... a uni-
versally recognized rank (conferring upon them a degree)—in short, creating [them as 
doctors]” (p. 84). This description seems to be a remarkably accurate representation of 
the structure of the modern university, which was just then coming into existence. Der-
rida (2004a) reminds us of the analogy Kant draws between this modern university and 
the industrial society then being established, a society that would create the University of 
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Berlin within 10 years of Kant’s writing, a university that was the first and still is the most 
imposing model of the modern university.
This is the model of the university which Fish inherits and defends, but Kant explicitly 
poses the question Fish sets aside or neglects. What orders and regulates the relations 
between specialized disciplines? Whenever a man-made or artificial institution, such as 
the university, is founded on the idea of reason, then its specific organization, while ap-
pearing to be merely empirical or happenstance, will have an a priori rational character 
(Derrida, 2004a, p. 85, citing Kant, 1979, p. 31). This rationality will be evident in the re-
lations between the different faculties. Kant distinguishes between the higher faculties of 
law, theology, and medicine, and the lower faculty of philosophy. The higher faculties are 
considered higher by the wider society because they are involved in the exercise of power, 
while the philosophy faculty is considered lower because of its lack of power. The higher 
faculties are required to produce useful knowledge concerning the running of society, 
and so will not have unlimited freedom. The lower faculty, in contrast, is concerned only 
with truth, and so must be totally free when it comes to judgments of truth. For example, 
the theologian is not allowed to question the existence of God, nor the medical doctor the 
value of health. The philosophy faculty, again in contrast, is the embodiment of the idea of 
reason which governs the university. The university is the idea of reason institutionalized; 
moreover, the philosophy faculty is that institutionalization of reason par excellence. The 
philosophy faculty, therefore, ought to control the higher faculties with respect to truth. 
That is, philosophy has the right to legislate over, or judge, the claims to truth that the 
higher faculties make. But philosophy judges not only the higher faculties of law, medi-
cine, and theology. Philosophy itself is divided into two departments: historical knowledge 
(for example, history, geography, philology, and the humanities, along with the empirical 
knowledge of the natural sciences) and pure rational knowledge (for example, pure math-
ematics, pure philosophy, and the metaphysics of nature and of morals). The philosophy 
faculty therefore “extends to all parts of human knowledge” and “can, therefore, lay claim 
to any teaching, in order to test its truth” (Kant, 1979, p. 45).
Although prescient in his description of the quasi-industrial division of labour in the 
new type of university, Kant’s account of philosophy in the German university seems very 
dated. We know that the scope and power of philosophy has shrunken enormously since 
Kant’s time, and even in his time the claim that the discipline could legislate over the nat-
ural sciences seems unfounded. However, Derrida implies that it would be wrong to inter-
pret Kant’s argument as being about philosophy in a literal or disciplinary sense. Derrida 
(2002, citing Kant, 1979, p. 9) argues that Kant is referring to philosophy as a discipline, 
of course. Less literally, Kant is also referring to reason as the tribunal that judges the rea-
sonableness of anything at all: “Such a tribunal is all powerful ‘by right’ and ‘in principle,’ 
since it does not claim to judge this or that, or particular ‘books’ or ‘systems,’ but rather, 
Kant specifies, it judges ‘the faculty of reason in general’” (p. 56) Thus Kant is referring 
to reason as the legislator or judge of what is reasonable. If we substitute in Kant’s argu-
ment the idea of the power of reason as the judge of what is reasonable, what Kant is say-
ing seems no longer anachronistic, but instead, Derrida argues, powerfully predictive or 
descriptive of the modern university. Whoever judges the truth of a statement has placed 
him or herself in the position not only of judging the truth of that statement, but also of 
judging the truth of truth, or of being the legislator of truth:
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A philosopher speaks and acts thus, whether he is a philosopher by profession or 
not... . This is the case, occasionally, of no matter whom, or very often, of the rep-
resentative of a non-philosophical discipline, a historian or a jurist, a sociologist, a 
mathematician, a logician, a philologist, a grammarian, a psychoanalyst, a literary 
theorist. This philosopher who puts forward, explicitly or implicitly, in the broad 
or strict sense, the question quid juris does not content himself with examining 
a judgment or pronouncing the law at work in an established field. He prepares 
himself to pronounce the law (on the subject) of the law. (Derrida, 2001, p. 58–59)
Derrida hints here that the Kantian tribunal of reason is not stable. More than one 
discipline or school can lay claim to being the tribunal of reason. Derrida shows that this 
instability is already there in the texts of Kant. We can approach this issue by asking, 
Where is philosophy located? It is the tribunal of reason and oversees all forms of knowl-
edge. This characterization would imply that philosophy should not be located in any one 
place; that is, it should not have a department of its own. In Kant’s account, in addition 
to philosophy overseeing everything within the university, there is in the university both 
a faculty of philosophy, which itself contains many areas that would now be separate dis-
ciplines, and several departments of philosophy within that faculty. As Derrida (2004a) 
puts it, philosophy is both the whole and part of the whole: “And so the whole forms an 
invaginated pocket inside every part or subset” (p. 106). This invaginated topology is 
widespread. A particular discipline or family of disciplines within the university and just a 
part of the university—the liberal arts being the case in point—is claimed to be the central 
discipline which gathers together, oversees, or makes meaningful the educational tasks of 
all the other disciplines. This discipline or family of disciplines is in turn claimed as that 
which will allow the university to be the remedy for the ills of the larger society of which 
the university is just a part.
Before turning in the next section to comment on this destabilization or delocaliza-
tion of the tribunal of reason in relation to the modern liberal arts, it is necessary to 
turn to Derrida’s analysis of the major alternative to Kant’s understanding of the univer-
sity, at the time of the founding of the University of Berlin. This alternative to, and reac-
tion against, Kant came to be known as German Romanticism (Humboldt, 1970; Schaf-
fer, 1990). Derrida (2004b) examines this reaction against Kant by discussing F. W. J. 
Schelling’s (1803/1966) “Lectures on the Method of University Studies.” Schelling’s ob-
jection to Kant’s model of the university (and to the Kantian critical philosophy more gen-
erally) is that it divides the university—into faculties, departments, and so on—without 
thinking through what substantively underlies the various divisions. That is, the divisions 
are overcome only in the formal sense of each faculty submitting to shared rules of reason. 
Schelling instead wants to think through the “originary unity” which “makes dissociation 
itself thinkable and possible” (Derrida 2004b, p. 67, original emphasis). Derrida (2004c) 
quotes Schelling (1966, p. 11): “The aptitude for doing thoughtful work in the specialized 
sciences, the capacity to work in conformity with that higher inspiration which is called 
scientific genius, depends upon the ability to see each thing, including specialized knowl-
edge, in its cohesion with what is originary and unified” (p. 131). Schelling goes on to say 
that “whatever is incapable of fitting harmoniously within that budding, living totality is a 
dead shoot which sooner or later will be eliminated by organic laws” (p. 131). This theme, 
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Derrida tells us, is “the rhetoric of naturalism, organicism, or vitalism as it plays upon the 
theme of the complete and interdisciplinary unity of knowledge, the theme of the univer-
sity as an organic social system” (p. 131).
Of particular interest are the consequences Schelling draws from this theme for the 
place of philosophy in the university. Schelling proposes that there should be no depart-
ment of philosophy. If philosophy is what thinks through and embodies the originary and 
organic unity of all the bodies of knowledge into one body, then it cannot be located in 
one place, since it must be everywhere: “That which is all things cannot for that very rea-
son be anything in particular” (Schelling, 1966, p. 79, cited in Derrida, 2004b, p. 72). For 
Schelling, philosophy is not a specialized discipline, but instead is the process of forming 
the unity of knowledge and culture across science, art, and poetry; that is, the very process 
of formation, or Bildung, or unifying translation between one field and another. He sug-
gests that instead of a faculty of philosophy, there can only be a faculty of arts (Schelling, 
1966, p. 73). Strictly speaking, there should not be a single, localized, locatable faculty of 
arts either, because the process of forming the unity of knowledge this faculty represents 
must also occur everywhere, and not just in one faculty or department. Nevertheless, 
one can see that the faculty of arts in a modern North American university might reso-
nate with Schelling’s analysis more than would professional or applied faculties. Derrida 
(2004b) points out that Schelling recalls the collegium artium to which Kant had also 
referred: a liberal institution that would not appoint doctores, but magistri, or teachers 
of liberal arts, and would avoid the bureaucratic organization of the university.
Ultimately, according to Derrida, Kant’s and Schelling’s topology of the university and 
the place of philosophy in it, while seeming to be opposing views, also share something 
important. Philosophy should be everywhere and thus nowhere, says Schelling. Philoso-
phy should oversee everything, says Kant, and in so doing, Derrida implies, it is in dan-
ger of moving dangerously about, displacing and disseminating itself. Elsewhere, Derrida 
(2002) refers to an “essential unrest of philosophical identity” (p. 7). Here he implies that 
there is an essential instability to the location of philosophy. It cannot know one place, 
or rest in one place. This analysis is Derrida’s deconstruction of the place of philosophy 
in the schema or system of the university. Philosophy destabilizes or dislocates itself. In 
advance, it is displaced from its place. It would be wrong to think that Derrida is simply 
advocating this displacement and dislocation. Instead, this displacement is simply what 
happens or takes place. The deconstructively oriented philosopher, or humanities schol-
ar, or sociologist is not imposing this displacement, but is reminding us that it is already 
underway; that we are already on the way to being out of place. The questions would then 
be how we relate ourselves to, or how we negotiate with, or how we conduct ourselves in 
relation to, this displacement.
THE LIBERAL ARTS IN DECONSTRUCTION
Philosophy, in its dominant traditions, locates itself as the leading form of knowledge 
and wisdom, as we have seen in different ways with Kant and Schelling. Derrida also dis-
cusses the theme of the dominance of philosophy in relation to professional education. He 
notes that commentators as different as Kant, Nietzsche, and Heidegger, among others, 
have insisted that professional education must be of secondary importance in the univer-
sity, and that pure or disinterested thought is the core of the university. This hierarchy, 
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Derrida (2004c) tells us, repeats the “profound and hierarchizing political evaluation of 
metaphysics” (p. 151), referring to Aristotle’s Metaphysics. At the top of the hierarchy, 
according to Derrida, is theoretical knowledge. It is knowledge of causes and principles, 
which have priority over merely useful knowledge. The person who has this theoretical 
knowledge “is the leader or architekton of a society at work” (p. 152). He is situated above 
the manual labourer who produces without theoretical knowledge, produces naturally, 
like a fire burns. This “theoretician–leader” is “in essence a teacher” (p. 152). Because he 
understands causes and principles, he can transmit knowledge rather than merely prac-
tise a craft. “To teach, then, and at the same time to direct, steer, organize, the empiri-
cal work of the labourers. The theoretician–teacher or architect is a leader because he is 
on the side of the arkhe, of beginning and commanding” (p. 152). He understands the 
reasons for things. Because he “answers to the principle of reason, which is the first prin-
ciple, the principle of principles,” he “takes orders from no one; it is he, on the contrary, 
who orders, prescribes, lays down the law” (p. 152). This hierarchy of knowledge not only 
implies a hierarchy of commanding and obeying, but also needs a social hierarchy to cre-
ate the conditions for the production of theoretical knowledge. A leisure or priestly caste 
is required that has the time to devote to theoretical knowledge, beyond the immediate 
concerns of pleasure or necessity, and the implication is that this leisured stratum must 
be supported by the productive strata of society.
Derrida is not condemning this hierarchy as such. He is instead indicating that this 
implied social, political, and epistemological hierarchy is carried along with, and by, the 
internal logic of the modern university, and he is warning that attempts to rethink or 
reform the university should be aware of the risks of reconstituting or strengthening this 
hierarchy. However, notable among defenders of the liberal arts is the explicit repetition 
and valorization of this hierarchy. The liberal arts are claimed to know the essential prin-
ciples for studying humanity, and on this basis they claim the right to direct, control, and 
judge the other disciplines. 
Such a claim is particularly evident in a book implicated in the history of St. Thomas 
University, the institution sponsoring these reflections on the liberal arts, and of which 
the current author is a faculty member. The book is entitled Liberal Education and Value 
Relativism: A Guide to Today’s B.A., by Myers, Malcolmson, and O’Connell (1996). My-
ers and Malcolmson have until recently successively held the position of vice-president 
academic for many years at St. Thomas University. This book proposes an uncompromis-
ing vision of its subject, repeating uncritically a received version of central themes from 
ancient Greek philosophy. Liberal education is concerned with the question of what the 
good life is for human beings, and the good requires us “to act in accordance with princi-
ples” and to “choose sound principles” (p. 7). The goal of a liberal education is to discover 
and teach these sound principles and to cultivate “a taste for the beautiful, the noble, the 
true and the good.” Liberal education is the “highest, the noblest, and the most fully hu-
man form of education” (p. 18).
Having elevated their own vision of education to the highest level, Myers et al. find 
most of the existing disciplines more or less inadequate.  For example, natural science 
is characterized as a primarily technological enterprise that produces “technical special-
ists who can put the discoveries of modern science to work in our economy,” and that 
sets aside the “moral and metaphysical significance” (p. 68) of scientific discoveries. In a 
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similar vein, social science is characterized as aiming at “discovering new techniques for 
solving practical problems, for making our world more efficient, more comfortable and 
more prosperous” (p. 71). In each case, the pursuit of comfort and prosperity is contrasted 
with the noble aims of a true liberal education. This contrast is particularly evident in their 
characterization of psychology: “Modern academic psychology has been very successful in 
its new technological role. The research undertaken by academic psychologists has led to 
all sorts of discoveries that make our world a safer, healthier, and more efficient place. But 
students who seek a liberal education will find few psychology courses that will aid them 
in their quest for human wisdom” (p. 72). Thus is reproduced in entirely uncritical terms 
what Derrida describes as the founding gesture of metaphysics referred to above, the valu-
ation of thinking; that is, of the search for principles and causes, over and above what is 
characterized as the unthinking pursuit of the lower needs of comfort, health, and so on. 
This hierarchy and its attendant luxury is explicitly valorized by Myers et al.: “Liberal edu-
cation is perhaps the greatest of luxuries in our modern world. It is a luxury in that, with 
no promise of any economic return, it costs a great deal of time and money; and, more 
importantly, it is a luxury in the sense that it is a prize of incomparable worth” (p. 18).
It is important to note what is at stake here. Myers et al. support a particular hierarchy 
of the disciplines. Other disciplines, from physics, to biology, to sociology or economics, 
have their own more or less implicit attitudes to their neighbouring disciplines, and an 
implicit model of a hierarchy of knowledge. The classical liberal arts advocates, however, 
have in addition a political theory that calls on them to put into effect and to institution-
alize their hierarchical vision of the disciplines. The practitioners of the mainstream arts 
and sciences, whatever their implied or even stated views on the relative value of the dif-
ferent disciplines, have a common commitment to shared procedures of reasoning and 
inquiry. This formal commitment to procedural rationality allows for mutual tolerance 
of substantively very different fields of inquiry. The classical liberal arts advocates are, 
in contrast, committed to a substantive hierarchy of the disciplines forever at odds with 
the actual constitution of the disciplines. This division into disciplines, as the discussion 
of Kant indicated, already has old and deep roots, and cannot, nor should not, be willed 
away. The classical liberal arts advocates are therefore permanently at odds with the en-
lightenment and post-enlightenment division of the university into the liberal arts and 
sciences, and have a political theory to motivate them to pursue the case.
Kant (1979) had argued that the conflict between the higher faculties and the phi-
losophy faculty could never end, because the philosophy faculty would always have to 
interrogate the truth claims of the higher faculties: “The philosophy faculty can never lay 
aside its arms in the face of the danger that threatens the truth entrusted to its protection, 
because the higher faculties will never give up their desire to rule” (p. 55).  Given that 
philosophy has been displaced from its regulative position, and given that the advocates 
of the classical liberal arts repeat uncritically the hierarchy of knowledge and the accom-
panying socio-political hierarchy of ancient philosophy, it is more likely today that it is 
they who “will never give up their desire to rule”; that is, to regain their former hegemony. 
For Kant the conflict between the higher and lower faculties was a regulated conflict. He 
likened the conflict to that between the government party and the opposition party in par-
liament; that is, between parties who ultimately had the same goals. The conflict can be 
characterized, says Kant, as concordia discors, discordia concors: discordant harmony, 
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harmonious discord. However, those who see themselves, like the St. Thomas University 
liberal arts advocates, as pursuing “the most fully human form of education” (Myers et 
al., 1996, p. 18), must see others as supporting a less fully human education. Myers et al. 
are thus removed from the sense of critical limits that Kantianism imposes, and from the 
resultant respect for the differentiation and specialization which is constitutive of the 
modern university. The result may a discordant discord, or a discord limited only by the 
capacity of the institution to absorb this discord without being destroyed. 
One solution to the dilemma faced by the classical liberal arts advocates is to found an 
entirely new curriculum, where the hierarchies and valuations inspired by classical politi-
cal philosophy can be constructed without the impediment of the existing university dis-
ciplines. St. John’s College in Annapolis, Maryland, is a famous example of such a radical 
curriculum.3 There are no departments, majors, minors, or electives. All students follow the 
same curriculum, which is a classical great books curriculum, beginning in first year with 
Homer and Plato and ending in fourth year with Wittgenstein and Heidegger. This cur-
riculum is supplemented with laboratories in natural science, where famous experiments 
in the history of science are repeated, with language tutorials in Ancient Greek and French, 
and with music tutorials. As a result, all first-year students study the same text at the same 
time, and so on for each succeeding year. The curriculum, taught in a rigorous fashion, pro-
vides a very rich and intense education. It is comparable to the ideals of Schelling, where all 
forms of knowledge are linked together in an educational process of self-formation.
Despite what may be attractive about the St. John’s model, it clearly cannot be gener-
alized to the university system more widely. It remains a highly specific model of educa-
tion, practised in this form by a very small number of colleges. Within its own realm, it 
reigns supreme, to the extent that none of the modern university disciplines exist as such 
at St. John’s College. Within the wider university system, the St. John’s model occupies 
an extremely tiny space, as if it were a department of one in a giant multiversity. Follow-
ing the logic of Derrida’s invaginated topology, the model, characterized by the logic of 
overseeing and transcending all the divisions of the industrial university, becomes a tiny 
pocket folded into a corner of the much larger system which it ostensibly watches over. 
Indeed, the St. John’s model cannot be more than a supplement to the wider univer-
sity system of specialized disciplines. Even if we imagined for a moment that the model 
became widespread or dominant, the graduates of such a system would have to enter 
graduate schools divided into the existing disciplines and taught by experts trained in the 
existing disciplines. The disciplinary structure of the modern university can no more be 
wished away than can the institutions of industrial society. 
Returning for a moment to Not for Profit, it can be seen that Nussbaum, as an advo-
cate of very strong and extensive reforms in liberal education is also calling, more or less 
explicitly, for changes to the wider society. Nussbaum is concerned about the erosion 
of democracy by the profit motive; St. John’s is concerned with excessive specialization 
and the absence of a shared culture. There are always diagnoses, more or less explicit, of 
the ills of contemporary society, for which the proposed reforms in liberal education are 
claimed to be a partial solution. These diagnoses of the wider society are always under-
determined theoretically and overdetermined by the authors’ own political preferences. 
Nussbaum advocates a socially progressive, Deweyan liberalism; Myers et al. advocate 
classical political philosophy; a left-wing sociologist might advocate for a greater empha-
58
CJHE / RCES Volume 42, No. 2, 2012
Derrida in the University, or the Liberal Arts in Deconstruction / C. Kelly
sis on social justice and social change. The content and direction of curricular reform can-
not be rigorously determined, because the debate itself is overdetermined by pre-existing 
political and social preferences and philosophies.
At times, the advocacy of reforms in liberal education takes on some of the qualities of a 
social movement. For example, the American Academy for Liberal Education (AALE) is an 
organization in the United States for accrediting institutions that offer a liberal arts educa-
tion. (Myers, formerly vice-president academic of St. Thomas University, is a member of 
the Council of Scholars of the AALE.) While the organization engages in the standard pro-
cess of assessing programs for accreditation, its mission is to promote liberal education as 
a social good or social necessity, referring to itself as a “bipartisan organization dedicated 
to defending and nurturing excellence in liberal education and assuring access to a quality 
liberal arts education to all who seek the benefits it portends.” This statement is part of the 
preamble to a “Scholar’s Essay” by W. R. Connor (n.d.) hosted on the AALE website. With-
in the essay, Connor repeats and clarifies one of the central themes of classical liberal arts 
advocates. Liberal education as they conceive it came into existence in the ancient world in 
“democratic Athens.” It was an education appropriate to the free citizens of a democracy. 
Two contrasts are intended here. First, free citizens are contrasted with slaves, many of 
whom had technical skills and positions of responsibility, but who did not have to manage 
their own freedom, or that of others. Second, “democratic Athens” is contrasted with the 
neighbouring “piranha states of the Ancient Mediterranean,” where the problems of living 
freely did not arise. In short, living as a free citizen in a democracy required specific skills, 
knowledge, and dispositions, and the liberal arts provided these “skills of freedom.”
Forming citizens for freedom is a heavy load for educationalists to believe they bear. 
This belief helps to explain the zealous sense of mission that classical liberal arts advo-
cates tend to display. Recall Myers et al.’s (1996) claim that liberal education is the “high-
est, the noblest, and the most fully human form of education,” and that “its final objective 
is the formation of thoughtful and civilized human beings” (p. 18). The burden of forming 
citizens for democracy makes it difficult to decide what curriculum is required to meet 
this objective. What emphasis should be placed on classical antiquity, on medieval Chris-
tianity, on early modern political theory, on modern natural science, and on the modern 
social sciences? The answers to these questions lack rigour. The great books reflex of the 
classical liberal arts advocates inevitably downplays the achievements of modernity and 
looks backward.4 It is infected with the idea of the cultivation of elites for leadership and 
command, and it is tempting to move from saying that liberal education is education for 
freedom, to saying that the majority of people have little taste for such freedom and such 
education, and instead need wise leadership from those who have such tastes. 
Fish’s Save the World on Your Own Time (2008) is an exasperated reaction to the 
overreach of the champions of the classical liberal arts. Instead, Fish implies, we have 
relatively well-functioning liberal democracies. Let all do their part; let the disciplines 
and the various institutions do their work. Let the university educate within the param-
eters of a mature industrial society, and do not project moral and quasi-religious feelings 
onto university education. Once education is taken over by this kind of moral mission, the 
debates about what is proper to moral education may never end. The curriculum of St. 
John’s College seems very rich and engaging, but in comparison to Nussbaum’s propos-
als it lacks engagement with non-Western cultures and religions, and with fine art. It also 
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lacks engagement with the modern social sciences. The point here is not that the present 
author could come up with a better liberal arts curriculum, but that there are not agreed 
upon and rigorous criteria for determining what such a curriculum should include.
In Canada, a recently founded university, with some of the features of the classical lib-
eral arts college, is Quest University, in British Columbia. Quest opened in 2007. Like St. 
John’s College, it dispenses with the normal disciplinary organization.5 Courses are orga-
nized on the “block plan,” which means that a sequence of single courses is taken full time 
for three-and-a-half weeks each, with the aim of providing a more intensive and focused 
educational experience. In the first two years, 16 block courses constitute the foundation 
program, covering the humanities and the natural and social sciences. In the final two 
years, each student develops a unique research question that guides his or her program. 
In light of this research question, specialized courses and experiential learning courses 
are chosen, together with a small number of electives. Overall, the Quest approach is de-
signed to provide a much more cohesive education than the normal majors, minors, and 
honours approach of most institutions, but it is also considerably more individualized 
than the extremely cohesive St. John’s approach. The curriculum emphasizes the types of 
courses typical in classical liberal arts curricula, with titles such as Fate and Virtue, Rea-
son and Freedom, and Democracy and Justice, but in addition it has an even heavier em-
phasis on natural science, including the life sciences, earth sciences, and physics. Quest 
shares with St. John’s the almost complete absence of the normal disciplinary structures, 
providing the curriculum designers with carte blanche from which to begin, though in the 
final two years Quest reintroduces more of the standard disciplinary courses as electives.6
Few advocates of the classical liberal arts, however, have the opportunity to fashion 
an entire university curriculum in this way. At St. Thomas University, Myers and Malcol-
mson, the local champions of curriculum reform in the direction of the liberal arts, had 
much more modest success. The Great Ideas Programme (recently renamed the Great 
Books Programme), established in the late 1990s during a period of attempted curricular 
reform, has a number of features common to classical liberal arts programs. There is a 
strong emphasis on classical political philosophy, English literature, and moral education, 
with courses such as Introduction to Great Ideas, The Quest for the Good Life, and Love 
and Friendship.7 Instructors from different disciplines teach in linked courses which at-
tempt to transcend or dissipate disciplinary boundaries. However, the entire Great Ideas 
Programme is constituted as simply another major, minor, or honours option, as it was 
realized that neither faculty nor students would support a required program for all stu-
dents. In other words, it lacks the elements of being taken by all students and constituting 
a core curriculum which characterizes St. John’s College and, to a lesser extent, Quest 
University. While constructing itself as a core, classical curriculum, the program must 
compete for students with all other disciplines, and it enrols among the fewest students 
of all disciplines at St. Thomas. In other words, unable to establish itself as a true core 
curriculum, it has to offer itself as what could be called an optional core. Other curricular 
reforms from this period led by the classical liberal arts advocates at St. Thomas Univer-
sity also met with only modest success. Breadth requirements across the whole curricu-
lum were extended to include six credit hours in mathematics or natural science, and/or 
in fine arts or music. An attempt was made to institute required across-the-curriculum 
courses in theoretical reasoning and in moral reasoning. These courses were piloted but 
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never adopted, because it seemed unlikely that sufficient instructors from the disciplines 
could be found to teach them. In addition, such required courses would draw students 
from the existing disciplines, likely leading to resistance from those disciplines.
The case of St. Thomas exemplifies the inherent paradoxes of curricular reform, as re-
fracted through Derrida’s analyses. The attempt to integrate knowledge in the search for 
human wisdom, in the form of a great ideas program, which is reminiscent of Schelling’s 
belief in the organic unity of all knowledge and of self-formation, cannot take hold across 
the curriculum and remains a tiny pocket within the institution. The attempt to regulate 
theoretical and moral reasoning across the disciplines, in the form of required courses 
in these areas—a loosely Kantian gesture—fails to gain traction against the institutional-
ized disciplinary differences. The point here is not so much to criticize these attempted 
reforms as to indicate, following Derrida and to a lesser extent Fish, that the disciplinary 
dissemination, or parcelling out, of reason is not some kind of error that can be wished 
away, but is a constitutive part of the modern university.
DEFENDING THE HUMANITIES,  
AND THE NATURAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
The deconstructive approach, which has guided the present analysis, does not lend 
itself readily to prescriptions for the future. Anything that might look like a prescription 
coming from the influence of Derrida would be more like a prescription on how not to 
prescribe, and on how to resist the control of those, who as we have seen, are eager to 
prescribe for the liberal arts and for the university. But this resistance to principles that 
prescribe and dictate is itself principled. So something must be said about this principled 
resistance to principles, which characterizes deconstruction. In a 1983 lecture, Derrida 
(2004c) asks: “Does the university, today, have what is called a raison d’être?” (p. 129). 
This French phrase captures the questions Derrida wishes to raise concerning the relation 
between reason and being, and how this relation connects to the essence of the university. 
The university was founded on the idea of reason: “We may reasonably suppose that that 
the university’s reason for being has always been reason itself, and some essential connec-
tion of reason to being” (p. 135). Derrida points out that there is a history to, and variation 
within, how reason and its relation to being has been conceived, from the ancient, to the 
medieval, to the modern world. 
The modern era has been dominated by what Leibniz called the principle of reason, 
which had several formulations. The two most important of these are, first, “nothing is 
without reason, no effect is without cause,” and, second, for every true proposition, a 
reasoned account is possible, or reason can be “rendered.”8 The principle of reason also 
implies, Derrida argues, a responsibility to “render reason.” Reasons or causes must be 
found and given. That is, the principle of reason places us under an obligation to give 
reasons or to “render reasons.” Most research in the modern university, suggests Der-
rida, following Heidegger, is founded on the principle of reason, or rather on a dominant 
interpretation of the principle of reason, which in effect turns the world into an object to 
be dissected, explained, and analyzed. In other words, the world is divided into different 
regions of being, or regional ontologies, and the disciplines then pursue the investigation 
of each region according to their ontological assumptions about their region of being, in 
accordance with the general spirit of rationality captured by the principle of reason.
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The principle of reason thus captures the spirit of the modern university, where the 
regions of reality are objectified, over and against the rational subject who investigates the 
rational causes of each region of being. These practices constitute the modern disciplin-
ary university devoted to research, which classical liberal arts advocates find too special-
ized and too technical, and insufficiently concerned with the pursuit of wisdom. We have 
already seen that Derrida is not opposed to this modern conception of the university. To 
be opposed to it would be in effect to have a quixotic opposition to modernity itself. But 
neither is Derrida entirely satisfied with the complete dominance of the principle of rea-
son. This position is in contrast to Fish, who vigorously and almost gleefully supports the 
disciplinary division of labour, and the abstention from moral and political questions that 
goes with it.
What, then, are Derrida’s concerns, and how are they different from those of the liber-
al arts advocates? Derrida suggests that reason has a richer history than what is captured 
by the principle of reason, or that there is more to reason than the version of it formulated 
in the principle of reason. As we have seen, the principle of reason is installed at the heart 
of the modern university, and is at the centre of modern techno-science. For Derrida 
(2004c), we are obliged to follow this principle: “To respond to the call of the principle of 
reason is to ‘render reason,’ to explain effects through their causes, rationally; it is also to 
ground, to justify, to account for on the basis of principles (arche) or roots (riza)” (p. 137). 
But, Derrida suggests, in addition to answering the call of the principle of reason to give 
reasons, there is also an implied call to ask about the principle of reason: “What grounds 
this principle which is itself a principle of grounding?” “Are we to use reason to account 
for the principle of reason? Is the reason for reason rational?” (p. 137). Is it obeying or 
disobeying the principle of reason to ask questions about it in turn? It is neither obeying 
nor disobeying it. We are entering into a deconstructive zone here, where the opposition 
yes/no finds itself suspended. Instead, deconstruction will excavate the suppositions built 
into the principle of reason. Derrida describes these suppositions as follows: “The modern 
dominance of the principle of reason had to go hand in hand with the interpretation of the 
essence of beings as objects, an object present as representation [Vorstellung], an object 
placed and positioned before a subject. This latter, a man who says ‘I,’ an ego certain of 
itself, thus ensures his own technical mastery over the totality of what is” (p. 139).
Deconstruction can thus be seen to be partly at odds with a dominant techno-scientific 
and empiricist self-understanding of modernity, where science would be presumed to be 
the ultimate arbiter of truth and reality. However, deconstruction is equally at odds, as 
we have seen, with the liberal arts schema borrowed from classical political philosophy, 
where the thinker as leader directs the masses who act rather than think. Indeed, Der-
rida (2004c) constantly warns about the risk that the types of questions he pursues could 
reopen this ancient hierarchy between the leisured class of thinkers and the ordinary 
“doers,” and is at pains to minimize this risk. To summarize, Derrida’s deconstructive ap-
proach questions and destabilizes the self-understanding of techno-scientific modernity, 
but just as much questions and destabilizes the metaphysical hierarchy presupposed by 
the liberal arts.
Lacking space for further elaboration of these questions here, let us simply note that 
the type of deconstructive response Derrida favours will, as he himself says, find a particu-
larly receptive and central place in the humanities (see, for example, Derrida, 2001). But it 
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will not only be found there. Something approaching a deconstructive type of inquiry may 
also take place in the social sciences, in the fine arts and performing arts, and even in the 
natural sciences. Deconstruction does not occur only once or in one place. If we should re-
spond to and question the principle of reason, up to and including questioning of the ques-
tioning form of thinking sanctioned by the principle of reason, this questioning/respond-
ing will not take place just once or in just one form. Each science, each discipline, and each 
mode of inquiry founds or grounds each time its own ontology and its own rationality. So 
if this grounding activity of the principle of reason takes place more than once and in more 
than one place, the deconstructive questioning of, and responding to, this grounding, must 
necessarily also take place more than once and in more than one place. Reminiscent of 
the displacements of philosophy Derrida detects in Kant and Schelling, the deconstructive 
response to the modern form of rationality will also be disseminated and scattered: it will 
not be grounded in any one place, time, discipline, or procedure. 
Derrida was involved in the late 1970s and early 1980s in helping to found a new phil-
osophical institution in France, the Collège International de Philosophie.9 A central idea 
of the new college was that philosophical research would cut across disciplines, including 
the natural sciences, the social sciences, and the arts and humanities, and that it would 
seek out and discover new philosophical problems within the sciences, arts, and even the 
professions. A second central idea was that the practice of philosophy in the college would 
be open to anyone with a proposal that was deemed suitable, regardless of whether they 
were philosophers by discipline, and regardless of their degrees or university affiliation. 
Whatever the precise merits of the interventions of Derrida and his colleagues, these in-
terventions were notable for being attuned to the reality that philosophy could no longer 
pretend to be a master discourse, and that problems of a philosophical order were already 
being elaborated in the existing disciplines. A new philosophical practice would thus have 
to exceed the boundaries of professional philosophy and of philosophy proper; that is, 
philosophy as a self-contained and magisterial discipline.
Some tentative concluding comments can be made here, though there are no prescrip-
tions to be drawn from Derrida’s work, and the context in Canada is radically different 
to Derrida’s France, and even substantially different to the situation of the humanities in 
the United States, where Derrida did some of his work and where the debates about the 
liberal arts are most developed and most germane. First, academics from across the dis-
ciplines should be called on to defend university autonomy, in the broad sense of inquiry 
and research free from external control. Such a call to defend freedom of inquiry, and 
fundamental as opposed to directed research in all disciplines, is a rallying cry to allow 
otherwise disparate disciplines and interests to coalesce and cooperate. But this defence 
must be of not only the humanities, but also the social and natural sciences.10 What needs 
to be defended is the liberal arts and sciences; that is, the enlightenment tradition of free 
scientific and scholarly inquiry. Given this aim, the activities of the classical liberal arts 
advocates are counterproductive. With their elevation of classical political philosophy, 
and their claim to judge the wisdom, or lack thereof, of the natural and social sciences, 
they divide the university, rather than uniting different sectors in the shared interest of 
defending freedom of thought, research, and teaching. Note also that a wide-ranging de-
fence of freedom of inquiry should preserve the freedom, not only of the major disciplines, 
but also of liberal arts programs like the St. Thomas University Great Ideas Programme, 
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or for deconstructive types of inquiry that would question and destabilize disciplinary 
assumptions. However, the liberal arts champions will have to give up their desire for 
hegemony and rule, and take their place as one of a large number of programs, none of 
which has the right to claim to rule over the others. They should give up this claim to rule 
over others, not merely as a pragmatic concession to the prevailing balance of forces, but 
also on principle. 
There is also a strong tradition in Canada of faculty unions and a national faculty 
union, the Canadian Association of University Teachers. These unions have been very ef-
fective in defending university autonomy, and in resisting managerialism and corporati-
zation (e.g., Turk, 2000). The classical liberal arts champions have generally been unable 
to ally themselves with these excellent organizations. The metaphysical assumptions of 
classical political philosophy lead liberal arts advocates almost automatically to sympa-
thize with the management hierarchy whose leadership role they believe to be natural, 
and which they wish to partake of, and to be suspicious of faculty unionization. They in-
terpret unionization as supporting their presupposition that natural and social scientists 
are merely technical workers, and not real thinkers, philosophers, and seekers of wisdom. 
Much needs to be done to defend and improve the modern university. Liberal arts cham-
pions will be better able to contribute to this effort if they come to a principled recognition 
of their own limits.
NOTES
1.  Such defences and diagnoses are appearing in great numbers. Fish (2010) recently 
listed 12, and he said the number could easily be doubled. In addition to the works 
discussed in this paper, the following sources suggests some of the diversity of per-
spectives recently brought to the issue: business/managerial (Knapp & Siegel, 2009), 
Deweyan pragmatic humanism (Gould, 2003), a university president (Bok, 2003), left 
wing/faculty union (Nelson, 2010), right wing (Horowitz, 2010), and a defence of clas-
sical liberal education (Roche, 2010).
2.  The translation of Kant in Derrida’s essay as quoted here differs slightly from the  pub-
lished English translation of Kant cited here.
3.  Information on the curriculum at St. John’s College can be found at http://www.st-
johnscollege.edu/academic/main.shtml. See also Miller (1998) for a  sympathetic but 
critical history of the development of the St. John’s curriculum.
4.  The fundamental goal of classical liberal arts advocates is moral and political. For such 
advocates, all education must fundamentally be moral education. The content of the 
curriculum must be determined by the moral effects this curriculum will produce. The 
analysis of what is required for moral education in turn depends on a political evalu-
ation of the nature of the wider society. An instructive comparison and contrast to 
the analysis of Myers et al. is Emile Durkheim’s classic account from the early 1900s, 
Moral Education (1961). Durkheim shares the classical viewpoint that education is 
what forms us, and makes us human, or civilized. However, for Durkheim moral edu-
cation should take place under the auspices of the new discipline of sociology, which 
would replace classical education with the spirit of modern science. Thus a similar 
evaluation of the need for moral education leads to very different recommendations 
for the content of that education.
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5.  Information concerning Quest University and its curriculum can be found at http://
www.questu.ca/.
6.  It should also be noted that Quest is a private university, one of very few in Canada. 
In this respect, it bears comparison to the recently established New College of the 
Humanities in England, a private college that has drawn criticism for offering an elite 
education at very high fees. A common theme of defenders of the classical liberal arts, 
as we have seen, is that education for freedom or virtue is a luxury not suitable for 
everyone.
7.  For the Great Ideas Programme, refer to http://w3.stu.ca/stu/academic/ depart-
ments/great_ideas/default.aspx.
8.  Derrida (2004c, pp. 135–136) cites Heidegger (1996, pp. 21 –22), who in turn cites 
Leibniz (1995, p. 75).
9.   See Châtelet, Faye, & Derrida (1998), Fynsk (2004), Leitch (1986), Wortham (2006), 
and many of the essays in Derrida’s two-volume Who’s Afraid of Philosophy (2002, 
2004).
10. On defending freedom of research in the pure and applied sciences, see, for example, 
Forer (2010) and Olivieri (2000).
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